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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
RELA MAE SPRAT'LING PARR, DOROtrliY
DEANE SPRATLING LOVE, CAROL BETH
SPRATLING HENSON, and COLEEN
SPRATLING HALL, formerly COLEEN
SPRATLING,
Plaintiffs-Respondent~,

-vs.ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a corporation, successor to Utah Savings & Trust Company, a corporation, administrator of the, estate of George Albert Steadman, deceased, also known as George A. Steadman, and ELVINA S. STEADMAN,
Defendants,

·····.····------------.-------··--

- .o:vmo Ccn1rt,

Ui·a:1

No 9668

EDITH STEADMAN GRE!EN and
SHELDON STEADMAN,
Intervenors-Appellants.
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District ·Court for Salt
Lake County, Hon. Stewart M. Hanson, Judge
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MA'TTSSON
1007 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants
W. D. BEATIE
Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
RELA MAE SPRATLING PARR, DOROTHY
DEANE SPRATLING LOVE, CAROL BETH
SPRATLING HENSON, and COLEEN
SPRATLING HALL, formerly COLEEN
SPRATLING,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

-vs.ZION'S FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a corporation, successor to Utah Savings & Trust
Company, a corporation, administrator of the
estate of George Albert Steadman, deceased,
also known as George A. Steadman, and ELVINA S. STEADMAN,
Defendants,

No9668

EDITH ST'EADMAN GRE'EN and
SHELDON STEADMAN,
Intervenors-Appellants.

APPELLANT'S' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF TJIE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to quiet title to a piece of land
cated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

lo~

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment
against all defendants, which motion was contested by
intervenors-appellants. The Court granted plaintiffs'
motion and entered its findings of fact, conclusions of
law and decree.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek reversal of the order granting a
motion for summary judgment and the entry of the decree thereon.
STAT'El\1EN·T OF FACTS
On the 2.2nd day of April, 1929, the piece of property
involved in this action was deeded to Walter Steadman
and sons by Abraham S. 1\fishkind and Sadie S. Mishkind,
his wife. (p. 6 of Exhibit 1) On the 27th day of January,
1944, Walter Steadman transferred the property to his
wife, Edith E. Steadman. (p. 20 of Exhibit 1) On January 3, 1945, Edith E. Steadman, widow of Walter Steadman, transferred the property to William Parley Spratling and Amelia Daisy Spratling, his wife. (p. 21 of Exhibit 1) On February 1, 1956, William Spratling and his
wife transferred the property to their daughters, the
plaintiffs in the above action. (p. 26 of Exhibit 1.)
George Albert Steadman, the son of Walter Steadman, died February 14, 1941. (R. 41). At the time of his
death Edith Steadman, his daughter, was a minor, age
1, and Sheldon Steadman, his son, was a minor, age 5.
Utah Savings and Trust Con1pany, now knovm as
Zions First National Bank, was on the 30th day of April,
1941, appointed as administrator of the estate of George
Albert Steachnan (R. 8); and on the 23rd day of December, 1942, the Third Judicial District Court, in and for
Salt La:ke County, ente·red its decree of distribution of
the assets of the estate of George Albert Steadman, de-
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ceased. (R. 41-4:3) At the ti1ne of the entry of said decree
Sheldon Steadn1an was six years of age and Edith Ste·adInan was two years of age. (R. 41) At said time the Utah
Savings and Trust Company was the duly appointed
and qualified guardian of the e~states of the minor children of George Albert Steadman. (R. 47) The property
described in the decree of distribution above referred to,
with any and all other property or estate whatever belonging to said deceased or in or to which he or his estate
n1ay have any interest not now known or which may
hereafter be discovered, was distributed as follows:
To Elvina S. Stead1nan, surviving wife of said
deceased, 1/3 thereof in her own right plus
the share assigned to her by said Deilis Albert
Steadman of 1/12, making in all an undivided
5/12 of said estate.
To Utah Savings and ·Trust Company, a corporation as guardian of the estate of said seven
minor children of the deceased, Ralph J. Steadman, Junior H. Steadman, De wain W. Steadman, Virgil Steadman, Mary Blanche Steadman, Sheldon Steadman and Edith Steadman
(each being entitled to receive an undivided
1/12 of said estate) an undivided
7/12 of said estate. (R. 43)
The plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest have
been in possession of t'he real property continuously since
1945 (R. 25) and have paid the taxes on said property

each year since that time and before the same became delinquent. (R. 23-24)
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Plaintiffs filed their con1plaint to quiet title to the
real estate in question and made as parties Zions First
National Bank, administrator of the estate of George
Albert Steadman, and Elvina S. Steadman, his widow.
(R.l-3)
Respondents, Edith Steadman Green and Sheldon
Steadman, filed a motion for intervention, answer to
plaintiffs' complaint and a counterclaim against plaintiffs
wherein they claimed that they had an interest in the
property as children of George Albert Steadman and that
seven years had not elapsed since they attained their
majority. (R. 4-9)
Plaintiffs in answer to the counterclaim filed by
intervenors alleged that George Steadman had no interest in the property, that the Statute of Limitations, namely 78-12-6, 78-12-8, 78-12-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
commenced to run against intervenors' guardian, namely
Utah Savings and Trust Company, in January, 1945, and
continued until the discharge of said guardian on September 11, 1957, and that seven years had passed. (R. 1012)
Zions First National Bank Association, successor to
Utah Savings and T·rust Company as administrator of
the estate of George Albert Steadman, filed a disclaimer.
(R. 13-15)
Thereafter, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary
judgment on the ground that the Statute of Limitations
had run in favor of plaintiffs and their predecessors
and against the legally appointed guardian of intervenors
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and that the Statute of Lilnitations had therefore run
against intervenors and there is no defense to the action.
rrhe nlotion is based upon the pleadings, records and files
in this action and the files in the Probate Division of
the Court as to the guardianship of said intervenors. ( R.
19)
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was granted, and the Court made and entered its findings of fact,
conclusions of law and decree. (R. 31-36)
ARGU~1ENT

POINT I.
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WILL NOT RUN
AGAINST A MINOR EVEN THOUGH THERE HAS BEEN
APPOINTED A GENERAL GUARDIAN FOR THE MINOR,
AND THE COURT ERRED !IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S'
MOTION FOR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN ENTERING
ITS FINDINGS OF F kCT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
DE:CRE'E.

The Statute of Limitations, 78-12-6, 78-12-8, 78-12-12,
Utah ·Code Annotated, 1953, or any other statute affecting
the right or possession to real property will not operate
against a person under the age of majority, as Section
78-12-21, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides :
"78-12-21. Disabilities enumerated. - ·Time of
not reckoned. - If a person entitled to commence
an action for the recovery of real property or for
the recovery of the possession thereof, or to make
any entry or defense, founded on the title to real
property or to rents or services out of the same,
is at the time such title shall first descent or aecrue, either:
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(1) Under the age of majority; or,
(2) Insane; or,
(3) Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in exeeution upon conviction of a criminal offense, for a
term less than for life;
T'he time during which such disability continues
is not deemed any portion of the time in this
article limited for the commencement of such actions or the making of such entry or defense.''
In the present case there is no dispute but that intervenors were minors at the time plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest obtained title and that seven years
have not run since intervenors, and each of them attained their majority.
This Court held in the case of Robbins v. Duggins,
61 Utah 542,, 216 P. 232, that where an administrator
is appointed and the right of action is in the administrator, if the administrator is barred, the heirs will also
be barred. The Court further held that upon. distribution
of the property, the property distributed passed from
the control of the administrator and that even though he
may still remain in possession, he holds the property as
an agent or bailee of the distributee and not as a re~pre
sentative, and the Statute of Limitations will not run
against the nrinor heir.
In this case, Utah Savings and Trust Company distributed the entire estate to those entitled thereto on the
23rd day of Decmnher, 1942-two years before Walter
Steadman attempted to transfer the property to his wife
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and three years before his wife transferred it to plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest.
Under the holding of the Robbtns v. Duggins case
supra, the statute would not run against the administrator of George Albert Steadman's estate. This brings
us to the question of whether or not the Statute of Limitations could run against the guardian of a minor and thereby exclude the minor from his right to a cause of action
or a defense to one.
74-4-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows:
''Property of intestate passes subject to probate
proceedings. - The property, both real and personal, of one who dies without disposing of it bywill passes to the heirs of the intestate, subject
to the control of the court, and to the possession
of administrator appointed by the court for the
purpose of administration."
Distribution to the guardian of a minor does not
pass title to the guardian. 25 Am. Jttr., page 69, Sec. 107
states:
"Title to Property.- Legal title to the property
of an infant or incompetent ward is in the ward,
rather than in the guardian. The guardian has
no beneficial title in the ward's estate, being merely the custodian and manager or conservator
thereof. When a deed or mortgage is taken by a
guardian for his ward, the title is regarded as
being in the ward.''

Messengale v. Barnes ('Tex., 1937) 106 S.W. 2d
368.
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A cause of action covering property in a guardianship estate is vested in the ward and not in the guardian.
Rawson v. Hardy, 88 Utah 131, 48 P.2d 473 (July,
1935). In the Rawson case the the complaint was brought
in the name of Mary E. Rawson, as guardian of the~ estate
of Clarence Hardy, an incompetent. ·The defendants demurred generally to the complaint on the ground that it
did not state a cause of action in favor. of the plaintiff
and against them, the contention being made that the
action is one in favor of Mary E. Rawson, the matter
reading 'as Guardian of the Estate of Clarence Hardy,
an Incompetent,' being merely descriptio personae. The
Court stated :
"Since the complaint shows no cause of action in
her but in her ward, it is argued, therefore, the
complaint fails to state a cause of action in her
favor. It is true that the correct way of bringing
an action on behalf of a ward is to entitle it,
'·Clarence Hardy by Mary E. Rawson, Guardian,'
etc. ; but in this case under the pleadings and the
stipulations entered into by the parties it is perfectly apparent that the suit was intended to be
brought in behalf of the ward. In determining
whether the person is suing ill his represootative
or his individual capacity, the averments of the
whole pleading should be considered."
What is the distinction between the powers of an
administrator and a guardian in connection with real
property¥ Under Section 75-10-1, an administrator may
sell any real property as well as personal property of the
estate, provided, as set forth in 75-10-2, the sale is reported to the court and confirmed by the court before title
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passes. 75-10-3 provides in part that the administrator
Inay sell any property of the estate without the order
of the court at eithe-r public or private sale and without
notice as he may determine, but must make return of
such sale in all cases. A guardian's action is limited. Seetion 75-13-32 provide'S in part that a guardian of property
must safely keep the property of his ward. He must not
permit any unnecessary waste or destruction of the real
properrty, nor make any sale without the order of the
court. 75-13-33 provides in part that the guardian may
sell, mortgage, or lease the real estate upon obtaining an
order of the court therefor, and as stated in 2·5 Am. J ur.,
page 70, Section 108 :
"Under modern statutes, although he has extensive powers over both a ward's realty and personalty, a guardian may not sell his ward's real estate
except under order of court.''
Page 78, Section 124 provides :
"It is, therefore, a firmly established general rule
that a guardian has no authority to sell real estate
of his ward without an order of court, in the absence of a statute expressly or by implication conferring the power or authority otherwise conferred
upon him, as by will."
The distinction between the authority of an administrator -and a guardian is clearly pointed out in the case
of Aronson et .al v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn. (Feb. 1937, Calif.), 65 P.2d 823. In this case
a suit was brought by a minor for the conversion of stock.
Sinee April 21, 1926, one or more persons have been
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the duly appointed and acting general guardians of the
persons and estates of the plaintiffs. Neither plaintiffs
nor their guardians demanded of the bank that the certificates be issued to them. ·The court states :
"In this rHspect we are asked to decide whether
or not the running of the statutory period where
there is a general guardian of a minor is a bar
to a subsequent action by the minor. The primary
contention of the defendant (respondent) is that
the answer to the question is yes. We are of the
view that the answer is no.
In deciding the question we have before us the
decision of the Supreme Court in denying a petition for hearing, aftHr the decision of the Appellate Court, in 11:aier v. Harbor Center Land Co.,
41 Cal. App. 79, 182 P. 345, 346. In that case, an
action was brought by a guardian ad litem, on
behalf of a minor, seeking to cancel a contract for
the purchase of realty and to recover money paid
under the contract. Respond8'llt contended that the
statute of limitations barred the action because,
prior to the appointment of the guardian ad litem,
the minor had been represented by a general
guardian who was at all times competent to sue
in behalf of the minor. In denying the petition
for hearing, the Supreme Court made the following statement: 'Vve desire, however, to say, in
respect to the claims made under the statute of
limitations, that in our opinion a complete answer
to all such claims is to be found in section 352
of our Code of Civil Procedure, in view of which
the statute of limitations could not commence to
rtm prior to the attain1nent of his majority by the
minor.' Said section reads as follows: 'If a person
entitled to bring an action mentioned in chapter
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three of this title, he, at the time the cause of action accrued, *** within the age of majority ***
the time of such disability is not a part of the time
limited for the commencement of the action.'
Defendant relies upon a sentence contained in Patchett v. Pacific Coast Ry. Co., 100 Cal. 505, 509,
35 P. 73, 75, to the effect that, when a cause of
action 'vests in an executor, guardian, or trustee'
who is unde·r no legal disability, the statute will
commence to run, despite the disability of a minor
heir, ward, or beneficiary. We cannot accept that
language as the law of this case. In that case, the
court was considering a trustee-beneficiary relationship solely. As we shall hereafter point out,
a guardian-ward relationship is ,inherently diJfferent. The question .as to a gu.ardian-ward re.lationship was not involved in the oase. The insert~on
of the word 'guar;diJan' was an inadvertence. In .any
event, the word, so inserted, was mere obiter dictum.
It will be noted that respondent's contention is
conditioned upon the vesting of the cause of action
in the guardian. Our Supreme Oourt has concluded this argument also by holding that such cause
of action vests in the ward and not in the guardian. Dixon v. Gries (·Cardozo), 106 Cal. 506, 39
P. 857. Since t'he right of action vests in the ward,
it is not affected by the failure of his guardian
to sue within the prescribed period, and the rule
that when a right of action in a trustee· holding
legal title becomes barred by limitation the right
of the cestui que trust is also barred has no application. Brown v. Midland Nat. Bank (·Tex. Civ.
App.) 268 S.W. 226.
The underlying reason for the difference in the
rule as to the running of the statute, which is ap-
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plied to guardians, and that which is applied to
executors, administrators, and truste-es, is clearly
shown in the case of O'Shea v. Wilkinson, 95 Cal.
454, 30 P. 588, 589, wherein the court states: 'An
executor, administrator, or trustee of an express
trust, or a person expressly authorized by statute,
may sue or be sued without joining with him the
persons for whose benefit the action is prosecuted,
but a guardian does not belong to any of these
classes. The guardian appears in the action simply to manage and take care of the interests of
the infant when he (the infant) is a party to the
action, and (the guardian) 'is no more a party to
the action than the attorney, who appears in an
action for one who has attained his majority, is a
party to the suit in which he enters his appearance.' Emeric v. Alvarado, 64 Cal. 529, 2 P. 418;
Justice v. Ott, 87 Cal. 530, 25 P. 691."
A further distinction lies in the fact that, although
the guardian could have commenced the action
within time and failed to do so, the ward, because
of his incompetency, may have been-indeed is
presumed to have been-tmable to impart to his
guardian sufficient facts to disclose the existence
of a cause of action, was under certain difficulties
with regard to testifying about them, and by
reason of the same disability may have been totally unaware of his rights. The incompetent should
not be penalized for his disabilities. To Ineet this
situation, section 352 of the Code of Civil Procedure and other similar statutes, tolling the statute of limitations during the continuance of the
period of disability in certain specified cases, were
enacted.
The rule ''rlhich we have adopted as prevailing
in this case has been generall~~ adopted in the other
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jurisdictions of the United States. For a summa.ry
of the cases on the subject see 6 A.L.R. 1690, entitled, 'II. Appointment of General Guardian for
Infant.' (Emphasis added)."
The above cases point out the. error contained in the
statement in 6 A.L.R. on page 1693 where comment is
made in connection with the case of D:ignan v. Nelson,
26 Utah 186, 72 P. 936. In the Dignan case supra, there
was both an administrator and a guardian and the property in question had not been distributed by the administrator to the minor or the guardian, and the case should
have been determined without mention of the fact that a
guardian had been appointed. The statements in the

Dignan v. Nelson case supra, and Jensen v. Jenkins, 24
Utah 108, 66 P. 773, relating to a guardian were mere
obiter dictum.
Other cases covering the duty, rights and obligations
of a guardian to a ward are

tn re llansen.'s Guardianship,

67 Utah 256, 247 P. 481 (192-6), vflolf v. U.S., 10 F. Supp.
899 (1935), Sh.arnbegian v. U.S., 14 F. Supp. 93 (19·36),

Aronson et al., v. Bank of America N. T. & B.A.~ et al.,
·Cal., 109 P.2d 1001 (1941) and Duliln v. Industrial Acci-

dent Co'mmission, et al., (Cal.) 149 P.2d 868 (1944).
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CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that neither the cause of
action nor the title to the property in question ever vested
in the guardian of appellants, and the Statute of Limitations could not run until they reached their majority;
that the lower court's deeision should be reversed and
the case remanded for trial.
Respectfully submitted,

GUSTIN, RICHARDS &
MATTSSON
.Attorneys for .Appellants
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